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INTRODUCTION
The United Kingdom’s (U.K.) June 2016 decision to exercise its
option to leave the European Union (E.U. or Union) represents one of
the great surprises in the complex history of supranational
organizations. Most of the discussion in the wake of that decision has
tended to stress the particulars of the referendum with regard to the
short-term advantages and disadvantages of a decision that has clearly
divided class and region within the U.K.1 Older individuals, and those
who did not live and work in the Greater London area, tended to vote in
favor of exit. Those who were younger and in professions like finance
† Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, New York University School of Law; Peter and
Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution; James Parker Hall Distinguished Service
Professor of Law, Emeritus and Senior Lecturer, University of Chicago. This paper is prepared
for the conference on Brexit organized through the Classical Liberal Institute and held at the
NYU Law School on April 14 and 15, 2017. My thanks to Philip Cooper, University of Chicago
Law School, class of 2017; and to Bijan Aboutarabi and John Tienken, University of Chicago,
class of 2018, for their careful research assistance on an earlier draft of this Article.
1 For a detailed breakdown on the issue, see The Brexit Index: A Who’s Who of Remain and
Leave Supporters, POPULUS, http://www.populus.co.uk/2016/05/brexit-index-whos-remainleave-supporters (last visited Dec. 31, 2017).
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and banking tended to vote in the opposite direction. It is easy to find
general theories of individual or group self-interest that explain both of
these voting patterns, even without assuming corrupt motives on the
part of those for whom exit was the preferred option. British people who
work daily in European markets have far greater incentives to remain in
the E.U. than people whose loyalties, though often in support of free
trade, have a more diversified portfolio of interests.
The Brexit decision, however, is important in yet another way. It
offers a case study on one of the hardest questions of political and legal
theory, which is the role of exit rights in the organization of the state.
This problem is one that arises, not only in connection with a decision
by one nation to exit a larger confederation, but also in a wide variety of
other contexts. In particular, three prototypical exit cases are of
relevance here. The first of these involves individual exit options from
private contractual arrangements, such as the repudiation of private
common ownership, the partition of jointly held land, or the dissolution
or division of private firms. The second involves the decisions of
individuals to exercise their exit rights from states or nations, usually
through emigration. The third deals with complex decisions by
government entities to engage in either separation or, in some cases,
annexation. Understanding these various patterns helps explain the
importance of exit rights generally. It also lends a cautious vote of
approval for the Brexit decision, notwithstanding the major
transactional challenges that will follow, industry by industry, in making
good on the British referendum.
I. EXIT RIGHTS IN PRIVATE TRANSACTIONS
When people enter into various kinds of transactions, one of the
first questions they commonly ask themselves is whether they have
preserved some form of exit right. The question, as posed here, is of
great generality, covering not only various kinds of exchange
relationships like contracts for the sale and hire of goods, but also the
creation of joint tenancies and tenancies in common, and the formation
of partnerships or other firms. In the first case, the duties between the
parties are normally specified with a good deal of particularity: it is
made clear which goods of what quality and quantity should be
delivered, at what price, and at what given time and place. The
complexities in these deals arise when there is a disruption in the
anticipated sequence of performance between the two parties, so that
the failure of one side to perform on cue gives rise to a set of options for
the other side in deciding whether to continue or end the relationship.
The situation in a joint tenancy is quite different. Here, it is
normally understood that none of the joint tenants owes any fiduciary
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duties to the others, so that each can move as aggressively as he wants in
the use and occupation of common premises so long as the others do
not push back. It is also possible for one joint tenant to change the
character of some portion of the land without the consent of his co–
joint tenants, who then receive a larger issue in other portions of the
land. 2 The want of any fiduciary duty tends to limit the use of joint
tenancies to highly specialized situations, of which the most common is
concurrent ownership between husband and wife; the right of
survivorship allows for the transfer of ownership to the surviving spouse
without any further legal action. In these two-party situations, the level
of trust between parties is usually high, so conflicts of interest will rarely
appear; and when they do, it is possible for a joint tenant to unilaterally
convert the relationship to a tenancy in common (where the
survivorship feature is eliminated) or to unilaterally call for the
complete partition of the property either by sale or in-kind division.
The situation inside the partnership or firm is somewhat different.
As Ronald Coase wrote years ago in his famous essay, The Nature of the
Firm, mundane matters of transaction costs often dictate the
appropriate form of organization. 3 The price system, which is involved
in the sale or hire of goods, is not costless to operate, for someone has to
both attach prices to individual services and specify other terms of the
ongoing relationship. All of these activities consume resources and are
subject to error and breakdown at every stage of a given exchange from
formation to execution. The formation of the firm represents the view
that individuals should be bound by relational contracts that do not
specify particular duties at each juncture in their common venture. In
dealing with these relationships, Coase identifies the “person or persons
who, in a competitive system, take the place of the price mechanism in
the direction of resources.” 4 As his phrase “person or persons” indicates,
Coase pays very little attention to the difference between the singular
and the plural in this formulation and thus does not address the
question of why some firms operate with a single head, and others
operate with a group of partners (often, but not necessarily, of equal
rank) who have divided the entrepreneurial responsibilities among
themselves. Unlike the situation with concurrent ownership, the
partners owe each other fiduciary duties of both loyalty and care. 5 They
2
3
4
5

See, e.g., Swartzbaugh v. Sampson, 54 P.2d 73 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1936).
R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 16 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
Id. at 388 n.2.
For the most influential formulation, see Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928):

A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not
honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard
of behavior . . . . the level of conduct for fiduciaries [has] been kept at a level higher
than that trodden by the crowd.
Id. at 546. In my view, Judge Cardozo applied this rule incorrectly in the particular case, which
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are bound by obligations of mutual good faith, which specify not
particular tasks to be done, but a way of approaching their mutual
obligations. The particular motivating force is the good faith obligation
that each partner shall weigh equally the welfare of his or her fellow
partners in making decisions, so that their benefits are treated as if they
were his benefits and their costs are treated as if they were his costs. The
partnership that achieves this nirvana has overcome all conflicts of
interest among its partners and makes good, at least in miniature, on the
traditional boast of “all for one and one for all!” But the only reason why
this system has a chance to work is that the partners get to select each
other in advance and typically pick persons with whom they share some
independent and antecedent affinity, such as that which exists between
parents and children or among siblings.
While an acceptance of the good faith objective within these select
groups goes a long way in forging effective cooperation among partners,
it is difficult to operationalize this principle. Further, these business
arrangements, in particular, come under massive pressure when one
party deviates from this good faith arrangement. At this point, a number
of different exit options present themselves. The partners could just go
their separate ways and thus abandon any synergies that may have
arisen among them. But this is easier said than done because there is no
obvious metric for either the separation of partnership assets or for the
conduct and timing of a sale of those assets from which the proceeds
could be divided. Or it could well be that partners switch the
relationship around into a long-term contract between two smaller
firms for the provision of particular services. The two or more separate
firms that emerge keep the same relational strategies among the smaller
group of partners, but revert to a long-term sale or hire relationship
under which cooperation takes place through discrete contracts and not
through an overall merger of governance over common affairs.
It is not possible to give one comprehensive explanation for the
partial disintegration of the firm into a system of “vertical integration by
contract,” but one obvious explanation is that certain subgroups work
more coherently together than others and thus generate higher levels of
trust by using more specific price-sensitive arrangements to deal with
their former partners. 6 Various kinds of requirements contracts and

asked whether one partner had offered to another a future deal that had come to him alone. In
general, there is no good reason to force partners in one deal to join together in a second deal
given the serious risk of some imbalance in the initial transaction, which makes it unwise to
force the association in a second transaction. For my views, see Richard A. Epstein, Contract
and Trust in Corporate Law: The Case of Corporate Opportunity, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 5 (1996).
For a particular application, see Burg v. Horn, 380 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1967).
6 For an early discussion, see Friedrich Kessler & Richard H. Stern, Competition, Contract,
and Vertical Integration, 69 YALE L.J. 1 (1959).
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output contracts meet this standard. 7 Under the former, a firm agrees to
meet all the requirements of its trading partners from its own
production. Under the latter, a firm agrees to take all the production
output from a second firm. In both of these cases, the requirements
taken or the outputs required can be subject to maximum and
minimum levels, and the prices for these contracts can be linked to
various indices that reflect a change in costs. Indeed, the line between a
once-unified firm and the independent operators is always shaded in
these cases of partial integration and it is not possible, without some
detailed knowledge of a particular industry, to indicate how these
relationships will shake out. Nor is it necessary for the economist or
lawyer to do so. It is only necessary that the legal system contain
methods that allow relationships to morph from one form to another, so
that a firm can dissolve into two separate units that in turn enter into
some long-term contract for the provision of various services on an
exclusive or nonexclusive basis. At this point, it becomes a matter of
private choice to determine what kinds of arrangements are sensible or
not.
Within this larger mosaic, the exit right is an indispensable tile
because it operates as the major protection against abuse in various
bilateral-monopoly situations, where the opposite party can push down
hard if an exit right is absent. This need for exit rights arises in every
type of arrangement, from individual sales to long-term vertical
arrangements to the formation of a firm. The requisite exit right,
however, does not provide the party who holds it with perfect relief.
Many transactions promise individuals gain from trade if a particular
transaction is properly executed. In the law of contract, these expected
gains often give a remedy to one side in the form of lost profits or
consequential damages should the other side breach. The exit right, in
contrast, allows for the rejection of the goods received and a return of
the cash paid, but not for any fraction of the losses incurred because the
transaction did not go according to plan. Even so, in many transactions
this exit option is the preferred remedy (even though it may provide
incomplete relief), as it is a self-help remedy that is cheap to exercise.
7

See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-306 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977):

(1) A term which measures the quantity by the output of the seller or the
requirements of the buyer means such actual output or requirements as may occur in
good faith, except that no quantity unreasonably disproportionate to any stated
estimate or in the absence of a stated estimate to any normal or otherwise
comparable prior output or requirements may be tendered or demanded.
(2) A lawful agreement by either the seller or the buyer for exclusive dealing in the
kind of goods concerned imposes unless otherwise agreed an obligation by the seller
to use best efforts to supply the goods and by the buyer to use best efforts to promote
their sale.
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The unilateral action of rejecting goods is sufficient to escape a deal
gone wrong. Given this exercise of self-help, the burden is now on the
other side to initiate litigation in order to preserve its supposed rights
under the contract, which is costly under any circumstances and unwise
if, in fact, there was good cause for the rejection of the goods supplied.
Whenever litigation costs are high, the more complete damages remedy
may be less attractive given the time and money necessary for its
enforcement.
The tradeoff here carries over to vertical arrangements and to
firms. The dissolution of a firm could result in a sale of assets followed
by a division of the proceeds, or it could result in the assignment of
specific assets to each of the parties accompanied by a sale of those that
neither desire. In these settings, claims for lost profits from the other
side’s breach of duty are rarely invoked; complete remedies are
expensive to implement and, given the complex path toward separation,
it is unclear which way the inequality among former partners runs. 8 Exit
rights are cheap, which makes them universally attractive. Nonetheless,
in some cases, such as when one partner keeps past revenues owed to
another, a suit for a recovery of payments owed is pursued for a
liquidated sum that is a lot easier to determine than lost profits inflicted
by the alleged bad faith of former partners. 9
II. POLITICAL EXIT RIGHTS
These private analogies go a long way toward explaining how a
system of exit rights works in the context of political rights. The first
form of this problem involves cases where one individual wishes to leave
a given country. This exit right should not be treated as a constitutional
given; some states reserve the right to keep their citizens within their
territory, which in turn allows them to condition the option to leave on
the forfeiture of property held in the jurisdiction. Even if these explicit
8 For a critique of the expectation measure of damages, see Richard Craswell, Against
Fuller and Perdue, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 99 (2000) (explaining weaknesses of Fuller’s tripartite
classification of contract damages as expectation, reliance, or restitution); Richard A. Epstein,
Beyond Foreseeability: Consequential Damages in the Law of Contract, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 105
(1989) (explaining the weakness of mitigation rules).
9 For the general case for liquidated damages, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 356 cmt. a (AM. LAW. INST. 1981):

The parties to a contract may effectively provide in advance the damages that are to
be payable in the event of breach as long as the provision does not disregard the
principle of compensation. The enforcement of such provisions for liquidated
damages saves the time of courts, juries, parties and witnesses and reduces the
expense of litigation. This is especially important if the amount in controversy is
small.
Id.
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burdens are not imposed on the exit right, most individuals understand
that they will suffer major losses in general social relations and business
opportunities if they leave, either with or without their own state’s
blessing. Yet in many cases, leave they do, and in droves. The young
individuals that fled Eastern Germany before the Berlin Wall are a case
in point. At home, their loss of liberty was manifest; their economic
opportunities were limited; their ability to draw down state pensions on
retirement depended upon contributing to the system for decades
before their claims would vest; and even then, it was uncertain that they
would be funded; and their social relations were undercut by state
surveillance and mutual distrust. They had little of value to leave behind,
and so they went until a wall kept them in place.
This exit right is of course valuable even in less draconian
circumstances. Inside the United States, for example, there are no legal
barriers that prevent any one person from moving to another state.
Differences in economic climate between states contribute to major
internal migrations that have altered the political landscape over the
past seventy-five years. While this exit right has been deservedly
celebrated, 10 it would be a mistake to think that the exit right is
tantamount to a complete remedy against government intrusions. More
specifically, the exit right does not protect individuals whose fixed
assets, typically real estate, are immovable. 11 Thus, a land developer can
quickly move its plans and capital from one location to another and
avoid the brunt of severe zoning restrictions or heavy service obligations
to supply, for example, affordable housing. However, there is no easy
way out for the owner of land whose capital asset goes down in value
once the same obligations are imposed. Indeed, in many business
contexts, the exit right is often hampered by statutory limitations,
making it difficult for a railroad, for example, to discontinue service
without an explicit government permit, or for an insurance company to
withdraw from a losing wind-insurance (e.g., hurricanes) market even if
it is prepared to throw in all of its other profitable lines of insurance. 12
Therefore, it is critical to ask which conditions, if any, can be attached
when any individual or firm seeks to exit a particular market. That
inquiry heavily depends on the level of judicial scrutiny, which in most
cases of exit obligations is on the low end of the spectrum due to the
somewhat dubious view that higher levels of scrutiny only attach in
cases where there is a loss of physical property as opposed to loss of
10 See Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473 (1991).
11 See Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights Under Federalism, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147
(1992).
12 See Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights and Insurance Regulation: From Federalism to
Takings, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 293 (1999) (arguing that rules that require a firm to continue to
operate at a loss count as regulatory takings).
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ability to enter into certain forms of business. But these restrictions on
the ability to recover make it more likely that people will exercise exit
rights given that they have no way to preserve their jurisdiction-specific
entitlements.
III. BREXIT AND EXIT
The first question to ask about Brexit has to do with the structure
and the stability of the E.U. The key point here is that the evolution of
the structure of the European market had the consequence of increasing
the level of heterogeneity within the organization, making it ever harder
to come up with a set of centralized solutions that made sense for all of
its members. 13 In all collective activities, the level of dissatisfaction
increases exponentially the further a given member’s private preferences
deviate from that of the overall group. Thus, in an oversimplified
version of the basic proposition, assume that the collective solution is
set—arbitrarily, but without loss of generality—at zero. If a firm’s
private evaluation of its ideal position is one unit plus or minus from
that collective solution, its level of dissatisfaction is the square of that
distance, which is also one. But let the distance move from one to two,
application of the same squaring function now yields a level of
dissatisfaction of four. Move it to three and it is nine, and so on. The
larger the dissatisfaction with the median solution, the higher the gains
that the members of the organization have to offer to keep the coalition
together. At some point, sooner rather than later, the forces of
disintegration start to take over. It seems that even a brief review of the
history shows that the expansion of the E.U., both in terms of the scope
of its activities and the increase in its membership, has undermined the
possibility of the cohesion needed to keep the E.U., like a rational firm,
together. At this point the E.U. looks like an ill-designed conglomerate
merger that should be unraveled so that a set of more discrete
contractual relationships can unite different countries in different ways.
The monolithic structure is not stable, in the sense that any collective
solution that it generates will create too much net unhappiness for the
overall structure to prosper. It is of course possible to keep such a union
together by brute force. But it is not possible to do so when exit rights,
even controversial exit rights, are preserved. 14 It is, therefore, important
13 Alberto Alesina, Guido Tabellini & Francesco Trebbi, Is Europe an Optimal Political
Area? 2 (CESinfo Working Papers, Paper No. 6469, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2983690
(asking whether increases in E.U. heterogeneity make the Europe project “too ambitious”).
14 Interestingly enough, there is a suggestion that the drafters of Article 50 never
anticipated its actual use. See, e.g., Planet Money: Episode 743: 50 Ways to Leave Your Union,
NPR (Dec. 21, 2016, 5:53 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/money/2016/12/21/506502394/
episode-743-50-ways-to-leave-your-union. In retrospect, this public-law political
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to understand how Brexit, which may be followed by other exit actions,
stemmed from the effort to concentrate too much power inside the E.U.
To start at the beginning, European integration began with the
1951 formation of the European Coal and Steel Community, which was
comprised of Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands,
and Luxembourg. The limited purpose of this common market was to
make use of the wide distribution of coal and steel to forestall another
major war. By 1957, those postwar fears had diminished in European
politics, but the idea of a common market led to the formation of the
European Economic Community (EEC). The EEC went into operation
in January 1958 with the explicit purpose of creating a common market
with the obvious systematic advantages of a free-trade zone. Its initial
members consisted of the same relatively cohesive group of six nations.
The point of the original common market was to allow free movement
across national borders of people, goods, services, and capital. Even the
movement of people within the closed universe did not present serious
problems, certainly not on the order associated with the immigration
and refugee problems of the last decade that are connected with the wartorn Middle East and other violent crises. A common market with such
modest aspirations, therefore, leaves each nation free to organize its
internal production as it sees fit, knowing that its comparative
advantage lies in keeping those regulations that foster commerce and
eliminating those that do not. The common market may require that
nationals from other states be allowed to cross borders for purposes of
trade, but it does not give them the right to become citizens or
permanent residents of other nations.
So as understood, a free-trade zone like the initial EEC has two
enormous advantages. First, it is capable of long-term operation among
countries that have very different ways of doing business internally
because it is unnecessary, indeed impossible, to impose a uniform set of
regulations on all nations with their very different histories and
institutions. Second, a common market offers better prospects for an
orderly expansion to include other nations with divergent traditions,
who can also gain the benefits of free trade across national lines without
having to agree on matters of collective governance. There is no need to
jigger other rules to take into account any set of unique circumstances.
The admission of the U.K. into the EEC in 1973, done only with much
uneasiness, was in fact possible only because of the then-limited nature
of its European commitment. For example, there was no need to
develop a common currency. Britain therefore remained on the pound
so exchange rates could vary as a rough measure of the relative
efficiency of the different national economies.
miscalculation overlooked the frequent use of exit rights in the realm of private associations.
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Within the framework of a common market, it is possible to adhere
to the traditional four freedoms that guarantee the free movement of
goods, capital, services, and people across state lines. That system, in
effect, creates a larger zone of tariff-free activity and should be
supported by all free-traders. In each of these cases, moreover, it should
be possible to specify the rules that govern this shift. It is not that all
goods, capital, services, and people are free from all forms of
government regulation. Rather, the central obligation that should be
placed on local governments tracks the rules of the dormant commerce
clause, as these have developed in the United States, chiefly at the hands
of the courts. 15 The initial presumption is that a nondiscrimination rule
applies; goods, capital, services, and people that come from elsewhere
are subject to the same regulations that are imposed on persons within
the home country. The nondiscrimination principle is used precisely
because no one, not even the most ardent defender of laissez-faire,
believes that all forms of regulation are counterproductive. At the very
least, regulations that impose formalities for the completion of certain
transactions have to be obeyed by outsiders as well as insiders. Much the
same can be said about the limitations that are imposed by antitrust
laws, consumer-protection laws, and the like. What the
nondiscrimination principle does is to avoid the knock-down-drag-out
fights that come from determining which set of rules is better than the
other. The home state, as a first approximation, gets to set the rules that
are used within its territory, so long as the locals are willing to play by
these rules as well.
This presumption can, of course, be overcome in certain cases. The
importation of flora and fauna that could endanger wildlife or threaten
to transmit disease can of course be stopped. 16 However, these safety
exceptions are in general few and far between, as most exported goods
are also sold within their country of origin. There is far less concern on
this dimension with respect to the movements of capital and service, but
the same principles can apply, if necessary, to limit the scope of the
nondiscrimination principle. The most obvious difficulty arises with the
movement of people across state lines, which poses risks that states do
have a right to prevent, most notably regarding terror, crime, and the
15 See, e.g., H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949); Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111 (1942); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); Baldwin v. G.A.F.
Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935). For a more recent case, see Comptroller of Treasury of Md. v.
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015).
16 For the American version, see Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (protection of local
fisheries from parasites and non-native species justify restrictions on importation). For the
protection of public health under the World Trade Organization, see WORLD HEALTH ORG. &
WORLD TRADE ORG., WTO AGREEMENTS & PUBLIC HEALTH: A JOINT STUDY BY THE WHO
AND THE WTO SECRETARIAT (2002), https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/who_wto_
e.pdf.
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possibility that the new entrants will become charges of the legal system
in terms of welfare benefits or have children that might claim rights to
remain. A small common market is better able to deal with these
questions than a larger one. The movement of people does not
(necessarily) scale with the same positive effect as the movement of
goods, capital, and services.
On this view, the great blunder of the E.U. was the shift from a
free-trade zone to a broader social and economic union under the 1993
Treaty of Maastricht, which placed the Union beneath an all-powerful
Brussels bureaucracy. A robust E.U. was created to “harmonize” the
laws of the various nations not only on trade but also on agriculture,
fisheries, and regional development. At this point, the operation was no
longer a free-trade zone, but a centralized planned economy whose
purpose was to make substantive demands on its member states that
went far beyond the nondiscrimination principle. In such a case, the
composition of the rulemaking bodies is critical, because there is no
single path down which they can travel. The difficulties grew as the E.U.
continued to expand its membership to the present-day number of
twenty-eight nations. The greater heterogeneity of the member states
points to the need to have more modest objectives like the common
trading zone. It is a sign of false optimism to think that the larger body
can handle the more delicate task of comprehensive harmonization
without opening serious fissures.
This is particularly true of the movement of persons—one of the
issues that prompted the Brexit vote. Immigration in every country has
never been subject to the same regime of free entry and exit applicable
to goods. New entrants are allowed in conditionally, and a state has to
decide how much to investigate each entrant prior to admission and
how much to monitor them after arrival. This often creates policy
difficulties, such as if there is a connection between criminal arrest on
the one hand and deportation on the other. 17 Similarly, with the notable
exception of the United States, countries do not extend citizenship
rights to newborns simply because their parents are present in the
country. At this point, the case for free movement is attenuated. One
partial fix is to limit the class of individuals who are entitled to enter, as
this reduces the pressure on individuated review of each application;
and that is much easier within a smaller European Community than a
larger one where cultural and language differences matter greatly. So it
is easy to have bilateral arrangements that let French citizens work in
17 The applicable American law is the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, 3546 (balances the need for
expediency with some notion of due process for those persons brought within the system). For
discussion, see Richard A. Epstein, America’s Immigration Quagmire, HOOVER INST.: DEFINING
IDEAS (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.hoover.org/research/americas-immigration-quagmire.
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London and British citizens retire in Southern France. But the same
level of confidence does not attach to a larger E.U., where the cultural
and economic gaps are larger, and it certainly does not attach if refugees
from war-torn locations make their way into one E.U. country and have
relatively unrestricted movement through all the rest.
The combined E.U. policies represented a fatal overreach, and the
overall trends in economic growth inside the E.U. switched
dramatically. 18 In the early post-war era, European growth was robust.
There was much catching up to do from the devastation of the Second
World War, and the basic strategies inside the smaller EEC were
generally pro-growth. It was also a time when the dominant
technologies were large-scale activities that often required a top-down
approach. But the innovation markets have moved since that time. The
overall situation was summarized to me in an email by Jesus FernandezVillaverde as follows:
Again, a more granular description would point out small promarket reforms here and there (i.e. in Germany in the early 2000s, in
Spain in the late 1990s), but making the point that the E.U. is less
friendly to markets, innovations, and entrepreneurship now than in
1967 gets 95% of the history right.
And this is particularly important because the technology of the
1950s and the technology of today are radically different. In the
1950s the frontier was nuclear power, airplanes, automobiles, etc.
These are industries where a top-down approach can handle many of
the challenges reasonably well. The government, for instance, can
hire a bunch of smart nuclear engineers and get things more or less
right. The technology of today (Airbnb, Uber, Amazon) is truly an
emergent process in the Hayekian sense, and a bunch of engineers
working for the French Ministry of Industry will never get it right.
Which bureaucrat will ever come up with [F]acebook? That is why
European kids log into their [F]acebook account (US company) in
their [i]phone (US company) to tell their friends they just binged
watched the new season of Game of Thrones (US company) in
Netflix (US company) and that they liked it so much they will order
the book for their Amazon kindle (US compa[n]y). 19

It is also worth noting that, consistent with his data, there is no
major company comparable to those mentioned above that has

18 For a tabulation of the trends, see Jesus Fernández-Villaverde & Lee Ohanian, Address at
the Hoover Institution’s Conference on Restoring Prosperity: Contemporary and Historical
Perspectives: European Productivity Growth (Feb. 11, 2017) (slide presentation available at
http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/villaverde_and_ohanian_presentation_post.pdf).
19 E-mail from Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde, Professor of Econs., Univ. of Pa., to Richard A.
Epstein, Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, N.Y. Univ. School of Law (Apr. 4, 2017, 08:23:57
CDT) (on file with author).
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generated business in the E.U., 20 which helps explain why that body
frequently takes an aggressive attitude on regulation and antitrust
matters with large corporations. 21 They do not have their own oxen to
gore.
In short, by 1975 pro-growth policies tended to give way to more
interventionist policies within the EEC. The consequence of this
transformation was that that overall growth lagged both internally and
in relationship to the United States (which for the last fifteen years has
had its own growth problems). With the expansion of the E.U. to cover
nations in different stages of economic development, greater
heterogeneity among E.U. members required costly negotiations to
achieve any common solution. Yet at the same time, the central
government in Brussels sought to do more than it had ever been done
before under its dangerous banner of harmonization. There are of
course two ways to harmonize—up and down. But the bureaucrats in
Brussels displayed strong social-democratic tendencies toward central
planning, and thus “harmonized up” on the naive assumption that more
regulation of labor and capital markets was better.
It is important to note here that a relatively small Brussels
bureaucracy is capable of imposing extensive obligations on E.U.
member nations only because the member nations have to bear their
own costs for integrating the various commands into their own codes
and then enforcing those obligations within their respective territories.
That leverage allows the Brussels bureaucracy to expand its reach by
conscripting national bureaucracies to implement its general directives.
Accordingly, the E.U. has strong employment discrimination directives
that address all forms of discrimination in labor markets. 22 To be sure,
20 For a list of large European firms, see List of Largest European Companies by Revenue,
WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_largest_European_companies_by_revenue
(last visited Dec. 31, 2017), which is dominated by old line firms, with oil and gas companies
and automotive companies heading up the list.
21 See Eleanor M. Fox, US and EU Competition Law: A Comparison, in GLOBAL
COMPETITION POLICY 339 (Edward M. Graham & J. David Richardson eds., 1997).
22 A sense of the scope of these obligations is apparent from the E.U.’s own celebration of
its expanded mission:

For many years the focus of E.U. action in the field of non-discrimination was on
preventing discrimination on the grounds of nationality and gender. A few years ago,
however, the E.U. countries approved unanimously new powers to combat
discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability,
age or sexual orientation.
New legislation thus has been enacted in the area of anti-discrimination, which is the
Racial Equality Directive (implementing the principle of equal treatment between
persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin in many areas of social life) and the
Employment Equality Directive establishing a general framework for equal treatment
in employment and occupation.
Justice: Building a European Area of Justice: Legislation, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://
ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/law/index_en.htm (last visited Dec. 31, 2017).
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the U.K. and other nations have national policies of their own on these
issues, so the choice presented by Brexit is not one between unregulated
labor markets (which I have long favored) and heavily regulated ones. It
is rather over the scope and rigidity of legislation, where it is highly
unlikely that any activity done through Brussels will ever reduce the net
obligations on member states, including Britain. The exact relationship
between regulation imposed from the center and labor market rigidity
in France, Italy, and Spain is not easy to determine, but there is no
question that some portion of the stagnation in the E.U. comes from the
move away from the pro-growth and pro-market policies of its earlier
days.
Matters were not made any easier when by 2002 the Euro had
become the single currency for nineteen E.U. member states, while
Britain retained the pound. Currency policy poses a particularly
interesting problem, given both the absence of a common E.U. fiscal
policy and the presence of major differences in the growth rates of
member state economies. Clearly a currency has to have a large enough
range to be serviceable, but just as the range can be too small, so can it
be too large. Putting Germany and Greece under the Euro meant that
changes in exchange rates could not buffer the distinct economic
differences between them. Centralized control meant that unwise
interventions could not be confined to particular countries but took
hold across the entire E.U. The uniform Euro also turned out to be an
enormous mistake in system design, given that each country could form
its own fiscal policy. It is always a question as to the optimal
geographical reach of a given currency. It will not do to have a thousand
different currencies, each covering some small portion of any given
country. But to yoke different countries together with a single currency
prevents the sensible adjustments that can otherwise take place through
alteration of the exchange rates so that weaker countries can improve
their export position by letting their currency float downward in
exchange markets. The rigidity of a single currency meant that other
steps had to be taken to keep the union together and these, in turn,
required some explicit subsidies that had to be paid from stronger
nations like Germany to weaker nations like Greece, if only to allow the
Greek government to pay back its debt to the German banks that lent it
money.
IV. A ROADMAP FOR THE FUTURE?
At one time, there was some genuine doubt whether the British
would actually go through with their Brexit option. But as of late March
2017, the Article 50 application to leave the E.U. has been filed and
finalized by the British. The framework under Article 50 is sketchy, but
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it does contain some points of note. First, under Article 50, there is
nothing that the E.U. can do to block the decision of the U.K. to exit.
Consistent with the basic theory of the firm, Article 50(1) of the Treaty
provides that “[a]ny Member State may decide to withdraw from the
Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements.” 23 The
withdrawal is triggered by a unilateral notification from the
withdrawing nation, which in this case took the form of a letter that
Prime Minister Theresa May sent to the E.U. on March 29, 2017. 24 The
letter stated that while the decision to leave was irrevocable, the U.K.
hoped to preserve “the deep and special partnership” as the E.U.’s
“closest friend and neighbour.” 25 Beyond this point, the Treaty provides
no clear roadmap for agreements, only stating that “the Union shall
negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the
arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its
future relationship with the Union.” 26 The procedures for negotiation
under Article 218(3) call for the E.U. to be represented by a Union
representative who sets the basic framework for the negotiations. 27 For
Brexit, that party is Michel Barnier. The Treaty also states that it “shall
cease to apply to the State in question” once the agreement is completed,
with a default term providing that it will cease to apply within two years
after the notification letter, or in this case by March 29, 2019. 28
This framework gives only limited guidance on how the
negotiations toward settlement will work. The unconditional exit right
under Article 50(1) is valuable, because it allows for the British to
extricate themselves from an organization that they do not wish to be
bound to, and to forge relationships with other nations unilaterally or
(more promisingly) through other organizations, most notably the
World Trade Organization, of which it is a member. But in fact, the exit
option does not come close to solving all the issues that remain on the
table. There remain matters of both principle and politics that have to be
solved. The ultimate success of Brexit critically depends on first,
working out the separation and then, on selecting some new mode of
cooperation that keeps maximum interchange between the U.K. and the
E.U. The situation here is exceedingly complex because there is no area
of economic and social life in which the Brexit arrangement will be self23 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 50(1), Oct. 26, 2012, 2012
O.J. (C 326) 43 [hereinafter TEU].
24 Letter from Theresa May, Prime Minister, U.K., to Donald Tusk, President, European
Council (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.scribd.com/document/343404076/U-K-Prime-MinisterTheresa-May-s-Letter-to-European-Council-President-Donald-Tusk [hereinafter Letter from
Theresa May].
25 Id.
26 See TEU, supra note 23, at art. 50(2).
27 Id. at art. 218(3).
28 Id. at art. 50(3)–(4).
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executing. Someone has to agree to terms, and the question is what
those terms should be.
In my view, the proper approach in this particular case relies on the
same logic that applies to the firm. In those cases where there are still
gains from trade, the objective should be to substitute long-term
contractual agreements for the single governance structure that created
so much difficulty. Ideally, as often happens with the firm, the sensible
arrangement is to put all questions of side payments to one side until the
working relationships are established. Negotiations over past debts are
at best transfer payments. But politics often takes a different course, and
in this instance, Theresa May has announced that Great Britain “has
already set aside £27bn to pay E.U. for a three-year transition deal.” 29
Her unilateral decision should ease the path toward a stable institutional
framework now that it is less likely to be subject to the tug-of-war that is
the resolution of financial obligations. There are necessarily difficult
transitional schemes, but the grand objective should be to work back to
the early common market arrangement between the U.K. and the E.U.
The first point is that Brussels no longer has any power over what laws
the British pass and why. Obviously, in the transition period, the British
then have to decide which of the European directives they wish to
incorporate into their domestic law and which they wish to jettison.
This inquiry could be complicated if there is some side agreement
between Britain and members of the E.U. that may (or may not) survive
that separation. There is no question that a lot of digging has to be done
on a field-by-field basis.
Nonetheless, it should be possible to keep much of the freedomoriented agenda associated with the original EEC. The free movement of
goods and services in both directions should be encouraged, subject to
the same antidiscrimination principles that applied before. That means
that British banks, for example, should be allowed to supply the same
services inside the E.U. after the breakup as they do now and members
of the E.U. should, in exchange, be able to supply the same mix of goods
and services to the U.K. The quicker one moves to this model of keeping
alive as much trade as possible, the lower the loss of production that will
come from the transition. The position here is not different from that of
a large firm that enters into complex cooperative agreements upon
fragmentation. It should be stressed that the restoration of the free trade
model produces gains to both sides and minimizes the disruption on the
ground for just about everyone. The E.U. can then continue to, if it
chooses, apply its strong harmonization model to its various countries.
But in my view, it would be a mistake for it to do so because the
29 Ross Logan, Theresa May ‘Has Already Set Aside £27bn to Pay EU for a Three-Year
Transition Deal,’ EXPRESS (Sept. 16, 2017, 11:24 AM), http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/
854815/brexit-transition-deal-27bn-theresa-may-pay-eu-three-years.
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pressures toward disintegration will remain for the twenty-seven
nations (that are widely different from each other) still inside the E.U.
The clear area of difficulty is that of the movement of persons,
which, in the form of the refugee problem, was among the levers that
helped move the Brexit vote. It would of course be a huge mistake to
stop all movement between the U.K. and the E.U. But one obvious fix is
that the U.K. need not buy into accepting refugees and certainly not at
the same level that has caused complex social problems in nations such
as Germany, Sweden, and elsewhere. But more limited movement
among a smaller group of nations is possible, and this would separate
the refugee problem from work-related movements. Finally, there is the
question of entering into free-trade agreements with other nations.
Theresa May has made it clear that she wishes to proceed on all fronts
simultaneously, in the hopes of sharing the gains of a different
cooperative arrangement. That position seems consistent with the
language of Article 50(2) that allows the parties to take into account
their future relationships as part of the separation agreement. 30
As a practical matter, moreover, May’s position has gained some
political support and intellectual respectability from the discussions
inside the E.U. about developing a model for a “Multispeed Europe,” 31
which recognizes that the lockstep movement toward further
integration may well be counterproductive. Indeed, some versions of
this proposal would cede enormous powers back to the individual states,
which could “essentially strip the E.U. back to being merely a single
market.” 32 It was clear, however, that proposals for modest
decentralization failed in the negotiations between the U.K. and the E.U.
in the run up to the June 2016 referendum.
A change of heart in this direction could well signify a recognition
that the E.U. cannot survive in its current form simply because its
median member is happy with its ongoing institutional arrangement.
What really matters is some version of the domino effect. Let the most
dissatisfied country decide to pull out, and each of the other twenty-six
countries that are left will have to reevaluate its own loyalty to the E.U.
The process here could easily lead to the formation of preferential
blocks in which some nations under the E.U. have closer ties to each
other than they do to the body as a whole. Yet once this takes place, it is
fair to ask: why worry about the changes, and why worry about Brexit?
If these changes reduce the stress on governance structures, they should
be encouraged. If other nations follow the path of the U.K., so much the
See TEU, supra note 23, at art. 50(2).
Valentina Pop, Once Scorned, ‘Multispeed Europe’ Is Back, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 1, 2017,
12:11
PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/once-scorned-multispeed-europe-is-back1488388260.
32 Id.
30
31

842

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:825

better if overall levels of production are higher. If the appropriate
common-market adjustments are made, then trade relations can be put
into place as quickly as possible under a model that makes as few
changes as possible, while transitioning back to something akin to an
economic common market.
The reality of the situation, however, undermines this rosy
scenario. The trouble is not on the British side. During the run-up to
Brexit, the common charge was that the campaign was isolationist and
populist and would therefore be against free trade and participation in
the global economy. Many rank-and-file Brexiteers were said to be the
same kinds of people as the anti-trade Trump faction in the United
States. But the exit letter of Theresa May reveals a very different spirit. 33
Britain reasserted its self-determination precisely to ensure its larger
participation in the global economy and proclaimed the goal of
acquiring a free-trade agreement with the E.U. as soon as possible.
May’s vision is to have negotiations on withdrawal and negotiations on
the future go in parallel, so as to minimize the period of disruption. It
ought to be possible to make the program work, because the need for
continued trade is as strong for members of the E.U. as it is for the U.K.
Nonetheless, it looks as though this pattern of simultaneous
negotiations will not take place. The hardliner is the E.U.’s chief
negotiator Michel Barnier, who insists on righting wrongs rather than
figuring out how to make the relationships work going forward. As is so
often the case, the sequence of negotiation tells the tale. 34 May wants the
negotiations to go on in parallel so that new trade relationships can be
defined and strengthened quickly. Barnier, along with the European
Parliament, takes the position that divorce proceedings must be
completed before any negotiations take place about future arrangements
on the highly technical grounds that the E.U. cannot negotiate with a
still-member state as though it were any outsider. 35 Indeed, in Barnier’s
view, the parallel negotiations over divorce and subsequent trade talks
would be “very risky,” despite the lack of clear explanation of what is
gained by slowing up the normalization of trade relations. 36 Although
the E.U. may wish to conduct side proceedings to determine, among
other things, how much money the U.K. owes the E.U. for obligations
previously incurred (some of which may be reduced or removed given
See Letter from Theresa May, supra note 24.
See Michel Barnier, Chief Negotiator for the Preparation and Conduct of the
Negotiations with the U.K., Speech at the Plenary Session of the European Committee of the
Regions (Mar. 22, 2017) (transcript available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH17-723_en.htm).
35 See Daniel Boffey, European Parliament Backs Red Lines Resolution for Brexit
Negotiations, GUARDIAN (Apr. 5, 2017, 10:57 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/
2017/apr/05/european-parliament-red-lines-resolution-brexit-negotiations.
36 Id.
33
34
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the separation), this is no reason to hamper forward-looking
arrangements. The E.U. claims the tidy sum of €60bn (£51bn) to settle
the key items of account: budget commitments, pension liabilities, loan
guarantees, and E.U. spending on U.K. projects. Each of these figures
can be contested along with countless other issues. But there is no
reason why the financial questions cannot be bracketed so that the
restoration of trade arrangements can take place swiftly.
By the same logic, there is no reason why the E.U. should take the
hard line that all four freedoms are so intertwined that it constitutes
illicit “cherry-picking” to take one without the others, given that the
pros and cons differ widely for each. All of the proposed freedoms that
survive could be reciprocal and if, as seems likely, that some separation
of the freedoms makes sense, why have the blanket rule requiring a tiein that does not work economically? Right now, the E.U. has
arrangements with other nations that are sui generis, and the same can
be done here so long as there is a willingness to make the best bargain.
Indeed, the entire stance of the E.U. has a deeply protectionist tone,
which will have the same consequences as all forms of protectionism.
The powerbrokers who negotiate the deal will profit from the exclusion.
The bureaucrats of Brussels will thrive as well because the hard line is
intended to make sure that their discretion is preserved over their nowsmaller dominion. But protectionist approaches trap everyone in the
crosshairs. If British banking services are kept out of the E.U., the E.U.
customers of British banks will suffer along with the British themselves.
Indeed, in one sense, the position could be riskier for the E.U. given its
bulky processes than it is for the U.K., which at least is free to enter into
other trade arrangements with the United States and its Commonwealth
trading partners. There is no magic way to proceed in bilateral
negotiations in high-stakes games. But the same principles that guide
the dissolution of the firm should carry over to the dissolution of the
E.U., and it becomes a matter of the greatest urgency that the E.U.
switch to a more constructive bargaining position that puts mutual
gains ahead of factional discord.

